CONTRACTS-FORUM

SELECTION-ABSENT

BAD FAITH, FRAUD,

OR OVERREACHING, A REASONABLE FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE
IN A COMMERCIAL CRUISE FORM CONTRACT IS ENFORCEABLE-

Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S.Ct. 1522 (1991).
The "forum-selection clause" is a contractual term that specifies a particular court ofjustice or tribunal for litigation.' When
contracting parties create a forum-selection clause, they frequently choose one that is exclusive, mandating that they litigate
any dispute arising under their agreement solely in a pre-selected
forum. 2 A commercial contract containing an exclusive forum
clause-ideally, over which the parties have bargained 3-affords
enhanced certainty and stability in the contractual relationship
because the provision indicates where individuals may litigate
their potential claims.4 The forum-selection clause, therefore,
promotes trade and encourages interstate and international corI Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual
Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 296 (1988). Courts
sometimes substitute the terms "choice-of-forum provision," "jurisdiction clause,"
or "forum clause." Howard W. Schreiber, Note, Appealability of a District Court's Denial of a Forum-Selection Clause Dismissal Motion: An Argument Against "Canceling Out"
The Bremen, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 463 n.3 (1988).

2 Schreiber, supra note 1, at 468-69. See, e.g., Docksider, Ltd. v. Sea Technology,
Ltd., 875 F.2d 762, 763 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[t]he district judge concluded that this
language represented the parties' intent to pursue any litigation that arose only in
Virginia"). Alternatively, parties may execute a non-exclusive clause, sometimes
termed a "permissive" or "consent-to-jurisdiction" clause, merely allowing litigation in a particular chosen forum. Schreiber, supra note 1, at 469. Whether a clause
is exclusive is a matter of contract interpretation; if an agreement is not exclusive, it
confers jurisdiction on a particular forum, but does not preclude jurisdiction elsewhere. Michael Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses in Internationaland Interstate Commercial Agreements, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 133, 134 (1982). The parties may also limit the
clause to bind only the contracting party whose multiple venue options otherwise
might require the opposing party to litigate in a distant forum. Id. at 134-36. In
civil law terminology, these clauses are called "prorogation" clauses (permitting
action in a given forum) and "derogation" clauses (prohibiting action in a particular forum). Id. at 136 n.7. See generally, Arthur Lenhoff, The Parties'Choiceof a Forum:
"Prorogation Agreements", 15 RUTGERS L. REV. 414, 415-30 (1961) (discussing the
history of prorogation and, particularly, derogation clauses in an international
context).
3 See Julia L. Erickson, Comment, Forum Selection Clauses in Light of the Erie Doctrine and Federal Common Law, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1090, 1093 (1988). The designated
forum and law can control the outcome of potential litigation, impacting the parties' substantive rights. Id. Therefore, forum clauses are typically the product of
bargaining upon entering into the contract. Id.
4 Gilbert, Choice of Forum Clauses in Internationaland Interstate Contracts, 65 Ky. L.J.
1, 2-3 (1976-77). Most contracts that include a forum clause also include a choice
of law provision indicating that the forum state's law will control potential disputes.
Id. at 3; Erickson, supra note 3, at 1092-93.
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mercial transactions by eliminating the fear of being subject to
suit in an unanticipated forum. 5
For those who view consensual adjudicatory procedure as
practical and judicially expedient, the doctrine apparently draws
on good common sense.6 Because of its manifest simplicity, contractual forum selection is an appealing alternative to the poten-7
tially complex procedures inherent in our litigation system.
Thus, most courts embrace the concept 8 and will enforce a
forum-selection clause unless the provision is clearly unreasonable. 9 The practice of contracting parties choosing in advance
where they will sue each other, however, is not as free of complications as it initially appears.'° The forum-selection clause some5 Gilbert, supra note 4, at 3. This predictability is somewhat diminished, however, because forum-selection clauses are not universally recognized. Erickson,
supra note 3, at 1093. Alabama, Georgia, Missouri, and Texas do not enforce
forum-selection clauses. Eric Fahlman, Note, Forum-Selection Clauses: Should State or
Federal Law Determine Validity in Diversity Actions?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 439, 457 n. 142
(1988).
6 Mullenix, supra note 1, at 293-96. Forum-selection clauses are a standard feature in large corporations' contracts because they control litigation costs by restricting litigation to a local forum. Stephen R. Buckingham, Comment, Stewart
Organization v. Ricoh Corp.:JudicialDiscretion in Forum Selection, 41 RUrGERS L. REV.
1379, 1382 (1989). Preselection of a forum for the resolution of disputes confers at
least one advantage on the enforcing court: giving effect to forum-selection clauses
helps the court to clear its docket. Mullenix, supra note 1, at 296. See The Bremen
v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972)("[t]he argument that such clauses
are improper . . . appears to rest at core on historical judicial resistance to any
attempt to reduce the power and business of a particular court and has little place
in an era when all courts are overloaded"). Presumably, the case will be heard in
the forum indicated in the parties' contract; as a consequence, the overall total of
litigation is not reduced, but merely relocated. Mullenix, supra note 1, at 296.
7 Mullenix, supra note 1, at 293-94. A forum-selection clause is, in a sense, a
waiver of the plaintiff's right to bring the case in an otherwise proper forum. Id. at
296 n. 11. Interpretation of procedural rights under a forum clause, therefore, is
based on contract law. Id. at 296. See infra note 9 and accompanying text. If categorically enforced, a forum-selection clause in the parties' contract simplifies a
court's task when faced with a motion for a change of venue. See Hoffman v. Burroughs Corp., 571 F. Supp. 545, 551 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (venue in other than the
chosen forum is presumptively wrong).
8 See Mullenix, supra note 1, at 293 (noting that party autonomy thrives with
universal court approval of the doctrine of consensual adjudicatory procedure).
9 Gruson, supra note 2, at 140-42; Schreiber, supra note 1, at 467. The inception of the reasonableness test in forum clause adjudication is credited to Judge
Learned Hand's concurring opinion in Krenger v. Pennsylvania R.R., 174 F.2d 556
(2d Cir. 1949). Gilbert, supra note 4, at 13-14. Judge Hand, in dictum, stated: "In
truth, I do not believe that, today at least, there is an absolute taboo against such
contracts at all;.., they are invalid only when unreasonable ....
Krenger, 174 F.2d
at 561.
10 Mullenix, supra note 1, at 296. Given that a forum-selection clause is a contractual provision governed by principles of substantive contract law, it may cloud
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times rides roughshod over intricate legal issues, breaching wellestablished jurisdictional precepts and sacrificing critical litigation rights. '
In a recent case, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,12 the
United States Supreme Court refused to limit enforcement of
forum-selection clauses solely to negotiated agreements between
parties of equal bargaining strength.' 3 Instead, the Court endorsed a broad utilization of forum-selection clauses, depite an
indisputable lack of bargaining parity, and concluded that a nonnegotiated forum provision included in a routine consumer
cruise ticket should be enforced.' 4
Russell and Eulala Shute, a Washington State couple,
purchased tickets through an Arlington, Washington travel
agency for a seven-day cruise aboard a Carnival Cruise Lines
(Carnival or Carnival Cruise) ship.' 5 The travel agency dispatched the Shutes' payment to Carnival's headquarters in
Miami, Florida. 16 Carnival Cruise in turn forwarded the ticketsissues of civil procedure due to characterization problems. Id. at 297, 322-23. Specifically, confusion may arise as to whether a forum provision is a subject ofjurisdiction or venue, or whether a forum clause supersedes the forum non conveniens
doctrine. Id. Questions of federalism-upon which the lower courts are not in accord-are also invoked, such as whether federal common law that construes consensual adjudicatory procedure overrides conflicting state law. Id. at 299, 301, 332,
336.
i 1 Id. at 296-97. Consensual adjudicatory procedure, by replacing jurisdictional
rules with contract precepts, allows parties to waive substantial and fundamental
rights. Id. at 302. One of the most basic rights of a plaintiff is the right to choose a
forum. Id. at 303. The plaintiff's choice in forum selection, which is bound up with
notions of fair play and substantial justice, is traditionally accorded great deference.
Id. Enforcing a forum-selection clause inherently merges concepts of personal jurisdiction (the power of a court over the parties in a case) and venue (deciding the
most convenient forum from among courts ofjurisdiction) because the right of the
plaintiff to waive choice of forum is meaningless unless the plaintiff also waives the
right to object to personal jurisdiction. Id. at 324.
12 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
13 Id. at 1527. In examining the forum clause for reasonableness, the Court recognized the lack of bargaining parity between the contracting parties, but elected to
concentrate on the realities of running a large-scale commercial cruise line operation and, consequently, the Court accorded little weight to the disparity in bargaining power. Id.
14 Id. at 1528.
15 Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 1988 A.M.C. 591, 592 (W.D. Wash. 1987),
rev'd, 863 F.2d 1437 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn, 872 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.
1989)(mem.), modified, 897 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
Carnival Cruise is the world's largest commercial cruise line operation. Paul Weiss,
Gibson Dunn Work on Cruise Line Deal, 74 N.Y. L.J. 5 (1991).
16 Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 379 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S.
Ct. 1522 (1991). Carnival Cruise is a Panamanian corporation and its principal
place of business is in Miami, Florida. Id.
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on the back of which appeared a passage contract containing a
forum-selection clause'

7

-to the couple in Washington."8

The

pair then travelled to Los Angeles where they boarded the ship,
Tropicale, destined for Puerto Vallarta, Mexico.' 9 While in international waters off the Mexican coast, the Shutes attended a supervised tour of the ship's galley, whereupon Mrs. Shute
stumbled over a deck mat and was injured.20
The Shutes filed a negligence suit against Carnival Cruise in
the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. 2 ' Carnival Cruise moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that the district court did not have personal jurisdiction
over the cruise line and, additionally, that the forum-selection
clause in the passage contract prevented the Shutes from bringing their suit in any court outside the State of Florida. 22 The district court, deliberating only the personal jurisdiction question,2 3
granted Carnival's motion for summary judgment. 24 The court
applied a minimum contacts analysis 25 and held that Carnival's
17 Id. The cruise passage ticket and accompanying contract was reproduced in
its entirety and appended to Justice Stevens' dissent from the United States
Supreme Court's opinion in Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, Ill S. Ct. 1522, 153438 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The forum-selection clause provided:
in all disputes and matters whatsoever arising under, in connection
with or incident to this Contract shall be litigated, if at all, in and
before a Court located in the State of Florida, U.S.A., to the exclusion
of the courts of any other state or country.
Id. at 1536 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
18 Shute, 897 F.2d at 379.
19 Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. at 1524.
20 Id.
21 Shute v. Carnival Cruise, 1988 A.M.C. 591, 592 (W.D. Wash. 1987), rev'd, 863
F.2d 1437 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn, 872 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1989) (mem.), modified,
897 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct 1522 (1991).
22 Shute, 897 F.2d at 379. The forum clause in the Shutes' contract was exclusive: "[A]II disputes ... arising under.., this Contract shall be litigated, if at all, in
" Id. (emphasis added). See
and before a Court located in the State of Florida ..
supra note 2 (discussing the significance of exclusive versus non-exclusive clauses).
23 Carnival, 1988 A.M.C. at 593-95. Personal jurisdiction, or "in personam" jurisdiction, is the power of a court over a person. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714, 724 (1877) (distinguishing between a state's power over a person and its
power over a person's property located within the state). See generally JACK H.
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.2-.28 (1985) (discussing the historical
development of jurisdictional principles).
24 Carnival, 1988 A.M.C. at 595.
25 Id. at 593-95. Constitutional considerations of procedural due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment mandate that defendants have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state such that the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction
comports with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citing Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
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contacts with the State of Washington were not sufficient to sustain the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over Carnival
Cruise.26
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.2 7 First, the court of appeals held that Carnival Cruise
had engaged in sufficient forum-related activities to subject28the
If
cruise line to the personal jurisdiction of the district court.
Carnival had not solicited business in Washington, the court determined, the Shutes would not have gone on the cruise and Mrs.
Shute would not have been injured. 2 9 The court then shifted its
26 Carnival, 1988 A.M.C. at 594-95. In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958),
the United States Supreme Court recognized that to find minimum contacts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant must engage in some affirmative conduct that amounts to a purposeful availment of the
benefits of the forum. Id. at 253. The Supreme Court has determined that the act
of a purchaser bringing the defendant's product into the forum does not constitute
purposeful availment of the forum. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 295, 297-98 (1980). The Court refined its position somewhat in
Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). Justice O'Connor contended that purposeful availment may be inferred by such conduct as intending to
market a product in the forum, establishing channels for communication with customers in the forum, advertising, or maintaining a sales agent in the forum state.
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
27 Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 389 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S.
Ct. 1522 (1991). The court of appeals withdrew an earlier reversal reported in
Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 863 F.2d 1437 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn, 872 F.2d
930 (9th Cir. 1989) (mem.), modified, 897 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct.
1522 (1991), and certified the case to the Washington Supreme Court to resolve
the issue of whether the state's long-arm statute conferred personal jurisdiction
over the cruise line. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 872 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1989)
(mem.), modified, 897 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991). The
Washington Supreme Court responded in the affirmative. Shute v. Carnival Cruise
Lines, 783 P.2d 78, 82 (Wash. 1989) (en banc). Thereafter, the court of appeals
modified and refiled its opinion. Shute, 897 F.2d at 380 n. 1. The Washington longarm statute provided, in pertinent part:
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who
in person or through an agent does any of the acts in this section
enumerated, thereby submits said person, and, if, an individual, his
personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state
as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of said acts:
(a) The transaction of any business within this state ....
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.28.185 (West 1988).
28 Shute, 897 F.2d at 386. The court of appeals asserted that Carnival Cruise
involved itself in the sort of conduct denoted by Justice O'Connor as constituting
sufficient minimum contacts to confer personal jurisdiction. Id. at 382 (citing Asahi,
480 U.S. at 112).
29 Shute, 897 F.2d at 386. The court of appeals used the "but for" test to discern
whether the defendant's minimum contacts were sufficient to uphold the exercise
of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 385-86. The familiar "but for" test is traditionally
associated with its application in tort law, specifically in the threshold determination of the prima facie element of causation. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
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attention to the matter of the forum-selection clause.3 0 Acknowledging that forum-selection clauses are presumed valid, the court
of appeals nevertheless proclaimed the clause at issue unenforceable on the ground that it was not bargained for freely and therefore did not express the parties' true intent.3 1
The United States Supreme Court granted Carnival's petition for certiorari3 2 to determine whether the court of appeals
correctly declared, despite the forum-selection clause, that the
Shutes' action should be adjudicated in federal district court in
the State of Washington. 33 The Supreme Court eschewed consideration of the personal jurisdiction question 34 and reversed
the court of appeals by finding the forum-selection clause valid
and enforceable. 35 The Court held that a forum-selection clause
in a passenger-ticket contract should be enforced when no evidence of fraud or overreaching in acquiring agreement to the
clause existed and when the contract was unaffected by bad faith
in selection of the forum. 36 The majority left open the possibility
that a forum clause may be defeated if the selected forum was
prohibitively inconvenient to one of the parties, but only if the
complaining party bears the "heavy burden" of demonstrating
§ 41, at 265-66 (5th ed. 1984). Under the
court's application of the test in the context of personal jurisdiction, if the defendant's contacts are seen by the court as substantial, continuous, and part of an uninterrupted chain of events that ended in the plaintiff's injury, the court is entitled to
reason that "but for" those contacts, the cause of action would not have arisen.
Shute, 897 F.2d at 386. But see, Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REv.
103, 109 (1911) (the defendant's conduct is the cause of the plaintiff's injury if the
injury would not have occurred "but for" the conduct of the defendant, although
that alone is insufficient to establish conclusively that the defendant's conduct was
the legal cause of the injury).
30 Shute, 897 F.2d at 387.
31 Id. at 388-89. The court of appeals cited the plaintiff's great burden of litigating the case in Florida as an independent justification for refusing to enforce Carnival's forum-selection clause. Id. at 389. The court suggested that the inconvenience
of the Florida forum to the parties and witnesses confirmed the reasonableness of
subjecting Carnival Cruise to the personal jurisdiction of the Washington district
court. According to the court of appeals, the Shutes were physically and financially
unable to maintain suit in Florida. Id. Enforcing the forum clause, the court of
appeals opined, would essentially deprive the Shutes of their day in court. Id. The
United States Supreme Court, however, rejected this contention as unsupported by
the record because the trial court made no finding concerning the Shutes' financial
or physical ability to undertake the lawsuit in Florida. Carnival Cruise Lines v.
Shute, I IS. Ct. 1522, 1528 (1991).
32 Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 39 (1990) (mem.).
33 Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. at 1525.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 1528.
36 Id.
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
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serious inconvenience.3 7
American jurisprudence has traditionally disdained the
forum-selection clause.3 8 Courts were wary of contract terms
purporting to limit jurisdiction to a particular forum because they
believed such provisions to symbolize veiled attempts to oust a
court of competent jurisdiction. 3 Thus, in the early case of Insurance Co. v. Morse,4° in which the United States Supreme Court
considered the validity of a statutory clause designating Wisconsin state courts as the exclusive fora in certain insurance matters,4 ' the Court invoked the historical judicial apprehension
against forum clauses.42 The Morse Court, in asserting that the
Id.
Erickson, supra note 3, at 1094.
39 Schreiber, supra note 1, at 465. In The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407
U.S. 1 (1972), the majority contended that the view that forum clauses impermissibly usurp courts ofjurisdiction was outmoded and wholly without merit. Id. at 12.
40 87 U.S. 445 (1874).
41 Id. at 450. The Morse controversy began its ascent to the Supreme Court of
the United States when a resident of Wisconsin sued the Home Insurance Company
of New York in a Wisconsin state court. Id. at 446. When the company sought to
remove the case into federal court under section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
Morse drew on an 1870 Wisconsin statute that prevented nonresident insurance
companies doing business in the state from removing suits to the federal courts. Id.
at 446-47. Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provides, in relevant part:
[I]f a suit be commenced in any state court against an alien, or by a
citizen of the state in which the suit is brought against a citizen of
another state . . . and the defendant shall . . . file a petition for the
removal of the cause for trial into the next circuit court ... and offer
good and sufficient surety for his entering in such court . . . it shall
then be the duty of the state court to accept the surety, and proceed
no further in the cause....
Judiciary Act of 1789, Ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79-80. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the state court judgment in favor of Morse. Morse v. Home Ins.
Co., 30 Wis. 496, 507 (1872). The United States Supreme Court reversed. Morse,
87 U.S. at 458. The Court later distinguished Morse as a case in which the issue
primarily concerned the unconstitutionality of a state statute restricting the right to
remove a case to federal court. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9 n.10.
42 Morse, 87 U.S. at 451-53. The Court explained:
Every citizen is entitled to resort to all the courts of the country, and
to invoke the protection which all the laws or all those courts may
afford him. A man may not barter away his life or his freedom, or his
substantial rights.... [A]greements in advance to oust the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void.
Id. at 451 (emphasis added). See Hobbs v. Manhattan Ins. Co., 56 Me. 417, 421
(1869) (parties are not permitted to grant jurisdiction by private agreement where
jurisdiction is not provided by Congress); Bartlett v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 46
Me. 500, 504 (1859) (a provision requiring suits to be brought in county of the
insurance company does not bind the insured; breach of contract remedy is administered by law, and controlled by the law of the forum in which the plaintiff seeks
vindication); Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 72 Mass. 174, 183 (1856) (parties may
not refashion legal rules concerning jurisdiction and venue by private agreement).
37
38
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Wisconsin statute was invalid, intoned the now-discredited generalization that parties may not displace courts ofjurisdiction by
private contract. 4 3 In the aftermath of Morse, this orthodox common law view opposing contractual choice of forum endured in
American courts for nearly a century.4 4
For example, the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania followed the Morse approach in The Ciano.4 5
The court examined whether a clause in the shipper's bill of lading,4 6 naming the courts of Gijon, Spain as the exclusive site for
resolution of disputes was simply an arbitration clause or an attempt to remove potential litigation from an otherwise proper
venue. 4 7 The court opted for the latter position and held that the
43 Morse, 87 U.S. at 451.
44 See Gruson, supra note 2, at 139-42 (explaining that the courts, relying on
reasonableness factors, began in the 1950s to discard the common law philosophy
that opposed forum clauses). Some writers suggest that judges, who were once
paid by the case, may have considered forum clauses a threat to their livelihood.
See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 4, at 9 (judicial disfavor of forum-selection clauses "may
have begun when judges were paid for the number of cases they heard");
Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983-84 (2d Cir.
1942) (suggesting that when judges' income came mostly from fees, they were inclined to preserve those fees).
45 58 F. Supp. 65, 66-67 (E.D. Pa. 1944).
46 A bill of lading is defined as:
An instrument in writing, signed by a carrier or his agent, describing
the freight so as to identify it, stating the name of the consignor, the
terms of the contract for carriage, and agreeing or directing that the
freight be delivered to the order or assigns of a specified person at a
specified place.
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 168 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted).
47 Ciano, 58 F. Supp at 66. The clause in the bill of lading read:
The shippers and receivers, waiving their right to be tried in their
home town expressly submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the
Judges and Tribunals the shipowners are located, for all litigations
that may arise from the present contract and its incidentals, regardless
of any provision to the contrary in the Code of Commerce or Law of
Procedure in matters ofjurisdiction. This clause shall be understood
to be always in force even though the ship's agents and the parties
interested in the cargo may have tried to settle in principle, by
whatever means, any differences that may arise.
Id. Ciano actually concerned six lawsuits brought by the owners of cargo aboard the
vessel. Id. The cases were consolidated and the shipper, relying on the forum provision in its bill of lading, moved for dismissal on the ground that the district court
did not have jurisdiction. Id. The court pointed out that the authorities were in
conflict over whether consent to jurisdiction clauses represented acquiescence to
arbitration (considered valid) or attempts to oust courts of jurisdiction (considered
invalid). Id. The Ciano court was persuaded, by the then most recently reported
case interpreting a forum clause, to construe the provisions as an ouster. Id. at 6667 (citing The Edam, 27 F. Supp. 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1938)). In Edam, the court held that
forum provisions limiting actions to foreign tribunals are not arbitration clauses
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clause was designed to indicate a preference for one court over
another.4" The court declared that this was an unacceptable effort to oust a proper court ofjurisdiction.4 9 Traditional doctrine
gradually began to erode, however, as a new trend favoring consensual forum selection developed in the lower federal courts. 50
By the middle of the twentieth century, the judiciary tended to
shy away from the notion that forum provisions ousted a court of
jurisdiction and, instead, began to treat the forum-selection
clause as a device by which a court may surrender jurisdiction
upon finding that enforcement of the particular provision was
reasonable. 5 '
An example of the then newly-developing approach appeared in the landmark circuit court decision of Wm.H. Muller &
Company v. Swedish American Line Limited.52 In Muller, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit gave effect to a
within the meaning of the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988),
but rather are attempts to oust the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States.
Edam, 27 F. Supp. at 8.
48 Ciano, 58 F. Supp. at 67.
49 Id.
50 See, e.g., Cerro DePasco Copper Corp. v. Knut Knutsen, O.A.S., 187 F.2d
990, 991 (2d Cir. 1951) (forum clause naming Norwegian courts as exclusive situs
for resolution of disputes held valid); Murillo Ltd v. The Bio, 127 F. Supp. 13, 16
(S.D.N.Y. 1955) (clause providing exclusive jurisdiction in Swedish courts given full
consideration), aff'd, 227 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1955); Cerro De Pasco Copper Corp. v.
The Alabama, 109 F.Supp. 856, 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (clause placing jurisdiction
exclusively in courts of France specifically enforced).
51 Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Validity of ContractualProvisionLimiting Place
or Court in Which Action May Be Brought, 31 A.L.R. 4th 404, 415 (1990). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 80 (1971) (reflecting the view that a forum
provision will be enforced unless it is unfair or unreasonable).
52 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967) (en
banc). Indussa found a conflict between forum clauses limiting jurisdiction to foreign courts in an in rem action and the prohibition in the United States Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) against exculpatory clauses. Indussa, 377 F.2d at 202.
COGSA provided in relevant part:
Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving
the carrier or the ship from liability for loss or damage to or in connection with the goods, arising from negligence, fault, or failure in the
duties and obligations provided in this section, or lessening such liability otherwise than as provided in this chapter, shall be null and void
and of no effect.
United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) § 3(8), 46 U.S.C. § 1303(8)
(1988). Muller nevertheless remains persuasive authority in cases that are not in
admiralty. Gruson, supra note 2, at 141 n.26. For cases preceding Muller, see supra
note 47 (citing cases in which forum-selection clauses were upheld). See also
Krenger v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 174 F.2d 556, 561 (2d Cir. 1949) (Hand, C.J., concurring) (forum clauses are invalid only if unreasonable).
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forum clause contained in a bill of lading that specified the Swedish courts as the exclusive situs of dispute resolution. 53 Muller

directed forum clause adjudication away from rote application of
authoritarian doctrine and focused on the reasonableness of the
forum clause.54 Recognizing the century-old hostility toward
consensual adjudicatory procedure, the Muller court contended
that there was no absolute ban on such provisions and insisted
that, in general, a forum clause should be given full effect. 55 Accordingly, the Second Circuit held that a court may properly decline jurisdiction if it finds that a forum-selection clause was not
unreasonable under the circumstances of the case.56
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
adopted the modem view in Anastasiadis v. S.S. LittleJohn. The
question before the court was whether the trial court abused its
discretion in declining jurisdiction over a breach of contract dispute. 58 An action was filed in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Texas by a Greek seaman, despite a
forum-selection clause in the seaman's employment contract providing that disputes would be governed by Greek law in the
53 Muller, 224 F.2d at 808. See supra note 46 defining "bill of lading." Muller
involved a shipping contract to deliver cocoa beans by cargo ship from Gothenburg, Sweden to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Id. at 806-07. Swedish American
Line's ship, Oklahoma, was lost at sea and Win. H. Muller & Co. sued in district
court for the value of the cargo. Id. at 807. The District Court for the Southern
District of New York, enforcing a forum-selection clause in the bill of lading against
a challenge that the clause ran contrary to section 1303(8) of COGSA, declined
jurisdiction and dismissed the case. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed, finding the forum clause reasonable and finding no evidence that the parties could not receive fair and just relief in the Swedish courts. Id.
at 808.
54 Schreiber, supra note 1, at 467.
55 Muller, 224 F.2d at 807-08 (citing Krenger, 174 F.2d at 561). "[T]he adherence
of the parties to [their] agreement, which for aught that appears was freely given,
should be given effect." Id. at 808.
56 Id. at 808. The United States Supreme Court later lauded this proposition as
the logical counterpart to that enunciated in National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964). The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10
(1972). The United States Supreme Court confirmed, in Szukhent, that contracting
parties may effectively submit to personal jurisdiction by agreement. Szukhent, 375
U.S. at 315-16. The Court enforced a contractual provision providing that the
spouse of a Michigan defendant would suffice as a surrogate for service of process
in New York. Id. at 318.
57 346 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1965), reh'g denied, 347 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1965).
58 Id. at 281-82. The Greek sailor in Anastasiadis found the living conditions unsatisfactory aboard the ship upon which he was contracted to serve. Id. at 282. He
expressed his feelings to the ship's master and filed a contract action while the
vessel was docked in Texas, alleging, inter alia, total breach of his contract of employment. Id.
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courts of Greece. 59 The court of appeals evaluated the fairness
of the dismissal by recognizing that the seaman was himself
Greek, that the vessel was only transitorily in the United States,
and that the ship owner made a formal agreement to litigate the
seaman's claim in Greece.6" Approving the district court's dismissal, the appellate court held that the parties' contract provision was controlling absent any indication that Greece was an
inconvenient forum for the plaintiff or would not provide an adequate remedy. 6 '
Notwithstanding the growing current of support for the
forum-selection clause, some federal courts preferred to adhere
to the old dogma-that a forum clause ousted courts of competent jurisdiction-and a split among the circuits remained unresolved until 1972,62 when the United States Supreme Court
delivered its opinion in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. 63 In The
Bremen, the Court again considered the enforceability of a clause
naming a foreign jurisdiction as the exclusive site for the resolution of disputes.64 The Court held that a forum-selection clause
59 Id. The forum clause provided, in relevant part, "[F]or any dispute between
the seaman and the ship, the Greek law will apply, competent courts to solve any
dispute will be the Greek courts at Piraeus." Id.
60 Id. at 284. The Anastasiadis court quoted the United States Supreme Court:
"[E]xcept as forbidden by some public policy, the tendency of the law is to apply in
contract matters the law which the parties intended to apply." Id. at 284 (quoting
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 588-89 (1953).
61 Id. at 284. Although Lauritzen concerned the question of whether a foreign
sailor had the right to invoke the Jones Act in a personal injury suit, the Anastasiadis
court believed the same test was appropriate in considering whether to accept jurisdiction over an essentially foreign dispute. Id. at 283 (citing Lauritzen, 345 U.S. 571
(1953)). TheJones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988), applied railway employee statutes
to personal injury actions filed by seaman. Id.
62 Compare, e.g., Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297,
300-01 (5th Cir. 1958) (bolstering the lingering common law antipathy toward the
forum clause by holding that a court cannot be ousted of its jurisdiction by private
contract), cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 999 (1959) and United States ex rel. Ray Gains, Inc.
v. Essential Constr. Co., 261 F. Supp. 715, 720 (D. Md. 1966) (enforcement of the
clause would severely hinder the plaintiff's right to proceed with its claim) and
Muoio v. Italian Line, 228 F. Supp. 290, 293 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (limiting jurisdiction to
judicial authority of Genoa, Italy was an illegitimate effort to oust the district court
of jurisdiction) with Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 367 F.2d
341, 345 (3d Cir. 1966) (forum clause is enforceable, and not an ouster) and
Takemura & Co. v. The S.S. Tsuneshima Maru, 197 F. Supp. 909, 912 (S.D.N.Y.
1961) (a forum clause is enforceable unless unreasonable).
63 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
64 Id. at 2-3. The Bremen controversy was an admiralty case concerning an international towage contract that contained a forum-selection clause designating the
London High Court ofJustice for the resolution of disputes. Zapata Off-Shore Co.
v. M/S Bremen (In re Unterweser Reederei, GmbH), 296 F. Supp. 733, 734 (M.D.
Fla. 1969), aft'd, 428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'd on reh'g, 446 F.2d 907 (5th Cir.
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should be enforced under federal law absent a strong showing
that enforcing the clause was unreasonable, unfair, or unjust. 65 In
the course of its decision' the Bremen Court incontrovertibly es66
tablished that forum clauses did not oust courts ofjurisdiction.
The Bremen Court grounded its opinion on policy considerations. 6 7 The majority assessed the forum-selection clause in view
1971) (en banc), vacated andremanded sub nom. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,
407 U.S. 1 (1972). Unterweser (a German corporation) contracted to tow an offshore drilling rig belonging to Zapata (a Houston based corporation) from the Gulf
of Mexico to the Adriatic Sea. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 2. The rig was damaged in a
storm in the Gulf of Mexico, long before reaching its destination in Italy. Id. at 3.
Zapata then directed Unterweser to haul the rig to Tampa. Id. Zapata thereafter
filed suit to recover for damages to its rig in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida. Unterweser, 296 F. Supp. at 734. Unterweser moved to
dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction and, alternatively, for a stay pending a hearing in the
London High Court ofJustice, pointing ofit that the parties' towing contract designated the London court as the exclusive court ofjurisdiction over the contract. Id.
The district court denied Unterweser's motions. Id. at 736. The court held the
forum-selection clause unenforceable and in a subsequent proceeding - again denying Unterweser's request for a stay - issued an injunction preventing Unterweser from prosecuting a breach of contract claim filed against Zapata in
London. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Zapata
Off-Shore Co. v. M/S Bremen (In Re Unterweser Reederei, GmbH), 428 F.2d 888,
890 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'd on reh'g, 446 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971) (en banc), vacated
and remanded sub nom. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). The
decision of the panel was subsequently adopted in a rehearing en banc. Zapata OffShore Co. v. M/S Bremen (In Re Unterweser Reederei, GmbH), 446 F.2d 907, 908
(5th Cir. 1971) (en banc), vacated and remanded sub nom. The Bremen v. Zapata OffShore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
65 The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15. The Court commented on the "more hospitable
attitude toward forum-selection clauses" taken in many of the lower federal courts,
that forum clauses are presumed valid unless unreasonable, and opined that this
view ought to be adopted by the federal courts in admiralty. Id. at 10. Federal
courts, however have neither limited this holding to cases in admiralty nor to cases
involving a foreign forum. Gruson, supra note 2, at 149. Courts have applied the
Bremen principles to all forum-selection clauses, even in domestic cases in which the
parties have selected a domestic forum and even where the parties are citizens of
different states. Id. See, e.g., Pellepdrt Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres,
Inc., 741 F.2d 273, 279 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that there is no reason the principles announced in The Bremen should not apply in the domestic context). Given that
The Bremen was decided under admiralty and federal question jurisdiction, it is arguably not authoritative in diversity disputes because a federal common law rule
must yield when state substantive law to the contrary is on point. Mullenix, supra
note 1, at 314, 332-33. See generally Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965)
(holding that federal courts, sitting in diversity cases, are to apply state substantive
and federal procedural law).
66 The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12, 13. The majority stated: "The argument that such
clauses are improper because they tend to 'oust' a court of jurisdiction is hardly
more than a vestigial legal fiction." Id. at 12.
67 Mullenix, supra note 1, at 312. The Bremen Court's policy concerns wielded
considerable influence on future decisions. Schreiber, supra note 1, at 468. In
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 518-20 (1973), reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 885
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of growing American involvement in international commerce and
(1974), and Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 62931 (1985), the United States Supreme Court, relying heavily on the Bremen standards, recognized the validity of arbitration clauses contained in international sales
agreements. In both Scherk and Mitsubishi, the Supreme Court focused on the particularly compelling need for predictability and concern for comity in international
transactions. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516; Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629. See generally
Dougherty, supra note 51, at 409-38 (containing a comprehensive list of cases construing forum clauses).
The Scherk Court considered whether an arbitration clause in an international
business acquisition contract barred a purchaser of assets from pursuing a remedy
in a judicial court under the Securities Act of 1933. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 509-10.
Section 14 of the Securities Act of 1933 provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or
provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any
provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall
be void." Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1988). The Court contended
that an arbitration clause in which parties agree to arbitrate before a specific tribunal is really a type of forum-selection clause that identifies the procedure as well as
the forum for resolution. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519.
Scherk concerned an agreement by Alberto-Culver (an American corporation)
to purchase toiletry manufacturing companies as well as certain trademarks in cosmetic goods from Scherk (a French entrepreneur). Id. at 508. A contract was
signed, containing an arbitration clause, which provided in relevant part:
The parties agree that if any controversy or claim shall arise out of
this agreement or the breach thereof and either party shall request
that the matter shall be settled by arbitration, the matter shall be settled exclusively by arbitration in accordance with the rules then obtaining of the International Chamber of Commerce, Paris, France....
The law of the State of Illinois, U.S.A. shall apply to and govern this
agreement, its interpretation and performance.
Albert-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611, 613 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 417 U.S. 506
(1973), reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974). Nearly a year after the closing, AlbertoCulver discovered encumbrances threatening to interfere with its exclusive use of
the trademarks. Id. at 614. Alberto-Culver filed suit in federal district court in Illinois which refused to enforce the arbitration clause. Id. at 612. Subsequently, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Id. The United
States Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision. Scherk, 417 U.S. at
520-21. The Court focused on the uncertainties wrought by complicated international agreements and found that specifying in advance a forum for dispute was
"almost indispensable" under these conditions. Id. at 516, 517. The majority predicated its decision on section 4 of the United States Arbitration Act and, finding
that the agreement was in accord with the Act, held the arbitration clause valid and
enforceable. Id. at 510-13. Section 4 of the United States Arbitration Act provides,
in relevant part:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another
to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition
any United States district court which, save for such agreement, would
have jurisdiction under title 28 [The Judiciary Act, 28 U.S.C.§§ 1 et
seq.], in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit
arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in
such agreement.... The court shall hear the parties, and upon being
satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order
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warned that adopting the absolute doctrine of the traditional
common law would do little to expand American participation in
world markets.68 Contractual forum selection, the majority recognized, facilitated participation in international trade by infusing contracts with certainty and furnishing a neutral forum for
dispute resolution. 69 The Court emphasized that the parties,
through their forum-selection clause, freely selected the courts of
England to resolve conflicts arising under the contract. 70 Noting
directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the
terms of the agreement...
United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988).
The Mitsubishi Court confronted the question of whether antitrust claims were
arbitrable under a valid arbitration clause. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 616. In answering in. the affirmative, the Court based its decision on the strong presumption, established in The Bremen and Scherk, in favor of enforcing forum-selection clauses
under federal law. Id. at 631, 640. Mitsubishi involved a disagreement arising out of
a sales contract between the Japanese corporation, Mitsubishi, and Soler, a Puerto
Rican automobile dealer. Id. at 616. Mitsubishi filed suit in federal district court
and sought to enforce an arbitration clause in its agreement with Soler, requiring
the parties to resolve all disputes arising under the contract by arbitration in Japan.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 723 F.2d 155, 157 (1st
Cir. 1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 473 U.S. 614 (1985). Paragraph VI of the
Mitsubishi Sales Agreement, "Arbitration of Certain Matters," provides:
All disputes, controversies or differences which may arise between
[Mitsubishi] and [Soler] out of or in relation to Articles I-B through V
of this Agreement or for the breach thereof, shall be finally settled by
arbitration in Japan in accordance with the rules and regulations of
the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association.
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 617. Soler counterclaimed, asserting antitrust claims against
Mitsubishi. Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 157. The district court, relying on Scherk, 417
U.S. 506 (1974), directed the parties to arbitrate most of the claims and counterclaims filed in the case in accordance with their agreement. Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., No. 82-538, slip op. at B-8 (D.P.R. Nov. 22,
1982), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 723 F.2d 155 (1st Cir. 1983), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 473 U.S. 614 (1985). The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed in part, but excluded the antitrust claims from arbitration, pursuant to
the United States Arbitration Act, which evidenced a public policy favoring the domestic adjudication of monopolization claims. Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 167-69. Despite acknowledging this strong policy, the United States Supreme Court reversed
on the issue and upheld the foreign arbitrability of the antitrust claims at issue.
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628-29. The Court dismissed, as unpersuasive in an international setting, factors identified by lower federal courts apparently mandating judicial resolution of claims. Id. at 632-39. The Court preferred to ground its
reasoning on the dominant trend in federal courts advocating the enforcement of
forum-selection clauses. Id. at 631, 639.
68 The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9. The Bremen Court stated: "The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn
contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under
our laws and in our courts." Id.
69 Id. at 17.
70

Id.
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that the parties' choice of forum resulted from arm's-length negotiations, the Supreme Court announced that, absent some
countervailing and compelling reason, forum selection clauses
should be enforced by the courts and honored by the parties. 7 '
The Court thus instilled a new animus into venerable freedom of
contract principles. 72 Following The Bremen, federal courts
quickly endorsed a contracting party's right to select, in advance,
the judicial body that would hear their disputes.
The watershed Bremen decision solidly entrenched reasonableness as the preferred bench mark in contractual forum selection.7 4 Though the prima facie validity of the forum-selection
clause had been acknowledged consistently in the nearly two decades following The Bremen, the judiciary did not hesitate to invalidate unreasonable clauses.75 Courts refused to enforce forum
provisions in cases where the chosen forum was substantially
more inconvenient than the court where the case was brought.76
71 Id. at 12.
72 Id. at 11. The Court iterated that allowing parties to agree in advance to
yield to the jurisdiction of a particular court "accords with ancient concepts of freedom of contract and reflects an appreciation of the expanding horizons of American contractors who seek business in all parts of the world." Id.
73 Schreiber, supra note 1, at 467. See, e.g., Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/
American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481-82 (1989) (a provision to arbitrate
claims was enforceable and in accordance with the Securities Act of 1933); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 17 (1984) (arbitration clause in franchise agreement enforced); Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., Inc., 883 F.2d 1286, 1290
(7th Cir. 1989) (forum-selection clause in equipment lease agreement was valid);
Karl Koch Erecting Co. v. New York Convention Center Dev. Corp., 838 F.2d 656,
660 (2d Cir. 1988) (forum-selection clause in construction contract should be enforced absent a strong showing to the contrary); Tisdale v. Shell Oil Co., 723 F.
Supp 653, 655-56 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (forum-selection clause in employment contract
was enforceable); Gaskin v. Stumm Handel GmbH, 390 F. Supp. 361, 365, 367
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (forum-selection clause was not rendered invalid because plaintiff
negligently fails to acquire a translation of a foreign language contract).
74 Gilbert, supra note 4, at 24.
75 See Dougherty, supra note 51, at 433-38 (enumeration of cases in which forumselection clauses were adjudged unreasonable under the specific circumstances
and, consequently, unenforceable).
76 See, e.g., Randolph Eng'g Co. v. Fredenhagen Kommandit-Gesellschaft, 476 F.
Supp. 1355, 1359-60 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (enforcing forum clause was unreasonable
because litigating case in contractual forum would place substantial inconvenience
on plaintiff). The United States Supreme Court referred to the inconvenience aspect of its Bremen decision in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478,
486 (1985). The Burger King Court found that the assertion of personal jurisdiction
by a federal district court in Florida over Michigan businessmen did not offend due
process. Id. at 487. The businessmen had sufficient minimum contacts with the
State of Florida, pursuant to their contract and interactions with Burger King, for
the Court to sustain personal jurisdiction over them in Florida. Id.
The Court, citing The Bremen, however, warned that jurisdictional procedures
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Similarly, other courts invalidated forum selection clauses when
the plaintiff was unable to acquire an effective remedy in the selected forum, 77 or when the forum-selection clause was garnered
by fraud or misrepresentation, misuse of superior economic position, or unconscionable means. 78 The United States Supreme
Court echoed these concerns in Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh
Corp.,79 where the Court declared that the presence of Atforumselection clause, while significant, was not the only factor in determining whether to grant a motion to transfer venue.8" The
may not be used to make litigation so arduous as to place a party at a drastic disadvantage, and may not divest a party of his day in court. Id. at 478, 486 (citing The
Bremen, 407 U.S. at 18).
77 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 758 F.2d 341,
346 (8th Cir. 1985) (forum clause in international contract unenforceable because
grave danger that selected forum would deprive plaintiff of day in court), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 948 (1985).
78 See, e.g., Couch v. First Guar., Ltd., 578 F. Supp. 331, 333-34 (N.D. Tex. 1984)
(forum clause unenforceable because it was a boilerplate provision designed for
convenience of drafting party, plaintiff was defrauded, and plaintiff had no notice of
clause); Horning v. Sycom, 556 F. Supp. 819, 821 (E.D. Ky. 1983) (forum clause in
computer sales contract bordered on unconscionable and, additionally, was unenforceable due to great inconvenience of transfer and disparity of bargaining
power); First Pacific Corp. v. Sociedade de Empreendimentos e Construcoes, Ltda.,
566 So.2d 3, 4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (forum-selection clause was invalid because the clause was induced by fraud).
79 487 U.S. 22 (1988). The issue in Stewart was whether a court sitting in diversity should apply federal or state law when considering a motion to transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) in conjunction with a forum-selection clause. Id. at 2628. The United States Supreme Court found that the existing federal procedural
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), was broad enough to command the question
presented. Id. at 28. This section provided: "For the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to
any other district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) (1988). Section 1404(a) provided the Court with a basis on which to
ground its decision, but at least one commentator has argued that it is of little value
in advancing the analytical progression of consensual adjudicatory procedure.
Mullenix, supra note 1, at 321.
80 Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29. Stewart involved a contract between an Alabama corporation (Stewart) and a manufacturer with its principal place of business in New
Jersey (Ricoh). Id. at 24. Seeking to enforce a forum clause in a dealership agreement requiring all disputes to be litigated in Manhattan, Ricoh moved to transfer to
New York or dismiss a suit filed against it by Stewart in an Alabama federal district
court. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 779 F.2d 643, 645 (11 th Cir. 1986), aff'd
on reh'g, 810 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 487 U.S. 22 (1988). The district
court's denial of the motion on the ground that forum-selection clauses are void
under Alabama law was subsequently reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Id. at 651. The circuit court remanded with instructions to transfer the case to New York, a result that was adopted in a hearing by the
full court. Stewart, 810 F.2d at 1071.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to correct and refine the
court of appeals' analysis. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 484 U.S. 894 (1987)
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majority maintained that courts must consider additional elements, including the convenience of the transferee forum, the
fairness of transferring in view of the forum-selection clause and
the relative bargaining strength of the parties. 8 '
Against this foundation of judicial precedent emerged the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Carnival Cruise Lines,
(mem.); Stewart, 487 U.S. at 25, 28. The Supreme Court noted that the court of
appeals, en banc, referred to federal statutes - including the venue statute - and
to judicial decisions in determining that a strong federal interest supporting forum
clauses mandated that the clause at issue be enforced. Id. at 25. The court of appeals then applied an analysis based on the Bremen standards. Id. at 28. While
agreeing with the court of appeals that The Bremen may have been "instructive," the
Supreme Court emphasized that the court of appeals erred in deciding whether full
effect is given to a forum-selection clause by applying exclusively the principles of
The Bremen. Id. at 28-29. The task before the court of appeals, the Supreme Court
instructed, was to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Ricoh's section 1404(a) motion. Id. at 29. See supra note 79 (quoting 28
U.S.C. section 1404(a) (1988)). Perhaps the clearest proposition to emerge from
Stewart is that a forum selection clause is a procedural issue of venue, and therefore
federal procedural law applies to the exclusion of state substantive contract law, at
least where the case is under diversity jurisdiction and the issue arises on a section
1404(a) motion to transfer venue. See Mullenix, supra note 1, at 334. Thus, the
Court simplified its task by declining to address specifically the contractual validity
of the forum-selection clause and based its decision instead upon the discretionary
question of venue. Id. at 334-36.
In the wake of Stewart, because the Court dealt with the forum clause in the
narrow context of a section 1404(a) change of venue motion, it remains somewhat
uncertain whether a federal court will enforce a forum-selection clause in a different procedural context in a state where the clause is invalid. Fahlman, supra note 5,
at 456-57. Additionally, the Court stated that the decision will promote forumshopping because parties seeking to avoid adherence to a forum-selection clause, in
states that do not enforce the clause, are encouraged to bring their case in state
court. Id. at 458. See infra notes 89-94 (discussing the forum-selection clause in
view of the Erie doctrine).
81 Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29. The circuit courts are not in accord on the question of
whether state law is trumped by federal common law policy favoring the forumselection clause. Erickson, supra note 3, at 1091. Compare Northwestern Nat'l Ins.
Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 374 (7th Cir. 1990) (it is doubtful, after Stewart, that
forum-selection clauses are governed by state law) and Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v.
Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 512-13 (9th Cir. 1988) (state law does not apply to
forum-selection clauses) with General Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc.,
783 F.2d 352, 357 (3d Cir. 1986) (where there is no federal interest, federal common law derived from The Bremen displaces state law; therefore state contract law
should apply). In Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd. 709 F.2d 190
(3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983), Judge Gibbons observed that
although the application of federal law was suggested by Supreme Court decisions,
the issue remained unsettled in the Third Circuit-at the time. Id. at 201-02. The
Eighth Circuit is internally split. Compare Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Frazier-Parrott
Commodities, Inc., 806 F.2d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 1986) (applying state law) with Sun
World Lines, Ltd. v. March Shipping Corp., 801 F.2d 1066, 1068 (8th Cir. 1986)
(applying federal law).
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Inc. v. Shute. 12 The issue was whether a forum-selection clause
printed on a form passage contract could be repudiated because
it was unduly burdensome to the purchaser.8 3 Writing for the
majority, Justice Blackmun began the Court's assessment by disposing of some prefatory matters.8 4 Justice Blackmun indicated
that the Court would refrain from inquiry into the constitutional
contention that Carnival Cruise did not fall under the personal
jurisdiction of the district court.8 5 The majority explained that its
disposition concerning the forum-selection clause resolved the
question of where the Shutes' claim against Carnival Cruise
should properly be determined.8 6 Justice Blackmun then prefaced the majority's legal analysis by delineating the scope of the
Court's inquiry.8 7

First, because the case fell within the Court's admiraltyjurisdiction, 88 justice Blackmun determined that federal law governed
the forum-selection clause.

9

Second, noting that the Shutes ef-

82 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
83 Id. at 1526.
84 See id. at 1525.
85 Id.
86 Id. Passing on constitutional questions not essential to deciding the case, the

majority reminded, was contrary to established Court policy. Id. Justice Blackmun
quoted: "It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional
nature 'unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.' " Id. (quoting Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)).
87 Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. at 1525.
88 Id. "Admiralty," by reference to "maritime," is defined as: "Pertaining to
navigable waters, i.e., to the sea, ocean, great lakes, navigable rivers, or the navigation or commerce thereof." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 968 (6th ed. 1990). See
Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (stating that
federal common law must control cases falling under admiralty jurisdiction because
following state law would be inappropriate). See generally FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra
note 23 § 4.7, at 224-25 (discussing historical aspects of federal law with regard to
admiralty).
89 Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. at 1525. A federal district court sitting in diversity
must consider whether the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), a
dominant element of federal jurisprudence, requires the court to apply state substantive law. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 23, § 4.2 at 194; Erickson, supra note 3,
at 1101. Erie stands for the now well-accepted principle that state statutory and
decisional law governs substantive issues where state law is not contradicted by
federal rules. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. The substantive versus procedural ambiguity of
forum-selection clauses poses an Erie dilemma, an issue the Court sidestepped here
by adherence to the principle that federal common and statutory law govern admiralty and maritime cases. Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. at 1525. See Mullenix, supra
note 1, at 332-34 (explaining that the Bremen Court never reached the Erie question,
leaving the courts split on whether forum selection is substantive or procedural
under an Erie analysis).
The key ingredients of the Erie doctrine, in addition to Erie itself, are the cases
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fectively conceded they were not without notice of the provision,
Justice Blackmun indicated that the Court need not contend with
the notice issue.90
of Guarantee Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec.
Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), and Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). York
introduced one of the Erie doctrine's fundamental concerns-the need for vertical
uniformity. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 24, § 4.3. The York Court explained that
Erie assured prospective litigants that if a federal court heard their state law cause
of action, the case should have the same outcome as if it were brought in state
court. York, 326 U.S. at 109. If the federal rule, the Court posed, would substantially affect the case in such a way that the outcome would be different under federal
law than if state law were applied, then the federal rule must give way to the state
law. Id. Where, however, the question concerns simply the "manner and means"
employed to secure recovery, that is, procedure rather than substance, the federal
court always applies its own rule. Id. Byrd later reshaped the Erie doctrine by declaring that state rules should not displace federal law merely by finding that federal law would affect the outcome of a particular case. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra
note 23, § 4.3. Byrd informed that state law must be balanced against strong federal
policies. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 538. Finally, the Hanna Court clarified that the York
"outcome-determinative" test "cannot be read without reference to the twin aims
of Erie: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws." Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468. Hanna further explained that while
federal law will necessarily apply only when there is a direct conflict between a
federal rule and a state law, if the federal rule indeed conflicts with the state law, is
both constitutional and broad enough to control the issue, and complies with the
Rules Enabling Act, then it must apply to the complete exclusion of the state law.
Id. at 470-72.
90 Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. at 1525. The case quotes the Shutes' brief: "The
respondents do not contest the incorporation of the provisions nor [sic] that the
forum selection clause was reasonably communicated to the respondents, as much
as three pages of fine print can be communicated." Id. (quoting respondents' Brief
at 26). Further support for declining to address the notice issue, reasoned Justice
Blackmun, was in the fact that as the court of appeals assumed, the Shutes were
aware of the clause when that court evaluated its enforceability. Id. As the
Supreme Court noted, however, the court of appeals termed the assessment that
the Shutes had adequate notice "doubtful." Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897
F.2d 377, 389 n. Il (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
The United States Supreme Court missed an earlier opportunity to determine
whether a forum clause in fine print on a cruise ticket was unenforceable for lack of
notice in Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 (1989). The Court considered whether the denial of a motion to dismiss pursuant to a forum clause was
appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Lauro Lines, 490 U.S. at 496. Section 1291
provided, in pertinent part: "The courts of appeals (other than the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all
final decisions of the district courts of the United States. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(1988). Holding that the motion was not immediately appealable because § 1291
allowed appeals only from final decisions, the Supreme Court explained that the
order was interlocutory and did not fall within a small class of claims allowed immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine. Lauro Lines, 490 U.S. at 498-501.
The collateral order doctrine came out of the United States Supreme Court
case, Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), in which the Supreme
Court allowed an appeal from the denial of a motion to compel compliance with a
state statute that required the posting of security costs in a derivative action. Id. at
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The Supreme Court pointed out that the court of appeals
correctly began its analysis with an exposition of The Bremen, but
the Court nonetheless warned that a routine utilization of the
Bremen principles to Carnival's form passage contract was inap543-47. The Cohen Court found that the order was final with regard to that question, hence the appeal was in compliance with the final judgment rule. Id. at 54647. See generally, Riyaz A. Kanji, The ProperScope of Pendent Appellate Jurisdictionin the
Collateral Order Context, 100 YALE L.J. 511, 512 (1990) (explaining the purposes
served and problems avoided by the final judgment rule).
The respondents in Lauro Lines were passengers or representatives of the estates of passengers aboard a cruise ship hijacked by terrorists. Lauro Lines, 490 U.S.
at 496. A printed contract on their passenger tickets contained a forum-selection
clause limiting all suits under the contract to adjudication in Naples, Italy. Klinghoffer v. Achille Lauro, 1988 A.M.C. 636, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), appeal dismissed sub
nom. Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines, 844 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Lauro
Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 (1989). In denying Lauro Lines' motion to
dismiss pursuant to a forum-selection clause, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York refused to give effect to the clause, holding that
the ticket did not give sufficient notice to the passengers that they were giving up
the right to sue in the United States. Id. On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the district court's denial of the motion
was not immediately appealable. Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines, 844 F.2d 50, 56
(2nd Cir. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 (1989).
Because the United States Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' holding,
the Court never reached the substantive equitable question of whether insufficient
notice would have rendered the clause unenforceable. See Lauro Lines, 490 U.S. at
497.
Lauro Lines is particularly noteworthy for the revelation that forum-selection
clauses may be frustrated by the final judgment rule. Cf Schreiber, supra note 1, at
470-71. If a party is forced to litigate in a place other than that indicated in its
forum provision, the benefit of the clause is essentially nullified even if an appellate
court ultimately enforces adherence to the clause. Lauro Lines, 490 U.S. at 502-03
(Scalia, J., concurring).
While it is true, therefore, that the 'right not to be sued [in other than
the selected forum]' is not fully vindicated - indeed, to be utterly
frank, is positively destroyed - by permitting the trial to occur and
reversing its outcome, that is vindication enough because the right is
not sufficiently important to overcome the policies militating against
interlocutory appeals.
Id.
Before Lauro Lines, the circuit courts differed on this aspect of forum selection.
Compare, e.g., Rohrer, Hibler & Replogle, Inc. v. Perkins, 728 F.2d 860, 891 (7th Cir.
1984) (motion to dismiss pursuant to a forum clause not immediately appealable
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291), cert. dernied, 469 U.S. 890 (1984) with Coastal Steel Corp. v.
Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d 190, 197 (3d Cir. 1983) (jurisdiction to
hear the appeal falls within exceptions to finality requirement), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
938 (1983). See also Rohrer, Hibler & Replogle, Inc. v. Perkins, 469 U.S. 890 (1984)
(White, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (arguing that because there was no significant distinction in the factual posture of Rohrer and Coastal Steel, the Court
should have granted certiorari to resolve the conflict). In Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille
Lauro ed Altri-Gestione, 858 F.2d 905 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed, 490 U.S. 1001
(1989), the Third Circuit again maintained that a motion denying dismissal is a
collateral order subject to immediate appeal. Id. at 908.
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propriate because of the basic dissimilarities between the cases. 9 '
The majority stressed that the contract scrutinized in The Bremen
was between two business corporations and, while the Court in
The Bremen enumerated factors that rendered the clause at issue
enforceable, it did not specifically define circumstances under
which enforcing a forum clause would be unreasonable.9" The
majority stated that the reasonableness factors discussed in The
Bremen might be applicable in discerning whether a similar clause
should be enforced, but emphasized that Carnival's passage
ticket contract was drawn under circumstances factually different
from those under which The Bremen's international towage contract arose. 93 Justice Blackmun observed that the court of appeals, cognizant of The Bremen's reasonableness factors,
inappropriately concluded that because the Shutes were not business people and did not negotiate the forum clause, the provision was unenforceable. 94 The Court dismissed the contention
that the provision contravened the reasonableness criteria set
forth by the the The Bremen Court merely because the disputed
91 CarnivalCruise, Ill S. Ct. at 1526. The Court regarded as an ostensible paradox the fact that both the cruise line and the Shutes relied on The Bremen in support
of their respective arguments. Id. Justice Blackmun asserted that the reason for
this circumstance is the parties' failure to account for crucial differences in the facts.
Id.
92 Id. The Court explained that the factors enumerated in The Bremen satisfied
the Court's inquiry into the reasonableness of the clause there at issue. Id. These
factors, the Court indicated, would apply to reasonableness scrutiny in an analogous situation. Id.
93 Id. A Florida district court, in a factual situation on point with CarnivalCruise,
found that the Supreme Court's language in Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487
U.S. 22 (1988), controlled the question of whether to enforce the forum-selection
clause at issue. See Bremen v. Cunard Line, 771 F. Supp. 1175 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
Stewart, the court recognized, established that a motion to give effect to a forum
clause is determined by reference to the transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Id. at
1176. Further, the district court noted, Stewart requires that the relative bargaining
strength of the parties is to be considered as a factor in a § 1404(a) analysis. Id. at
1177, 1178. The Florida district court declared: "this court determines that the
Supreme Court's previous guidance in Stewart provides adequate authority to prevent the transfer of the instant case." Id. at 1178 n. 1.
94 CarnivalCruise, 111 S. Ct. at 1526-27. But see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985) (enforcing such a provision does not violate due
process as long as it is "freely negotiated" and not "unreasonable and unjust").
Ordinarily, business people are presumed to understand the nature of their agreements. Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Graham, 646 F. Supp. 1410, 1415 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
The average passenger aboard a cruise ship, however, is not aware of the extent to
which sensitive rights are affected by a cruise ticket contract. See Todd D. Rakoff,
Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1179 (1983)
(usually, parties neither understand, nor, in most cases, even read the terms of contracts of adhesion).
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forum clause was not bargained for, but appeared instead on the
back of a ticket received after purchase. 95
After criticizing the court of appeals for failing to distinguish
relevant facts and, thereby, misapplying The Bremen principles,
Justice Blackmun articulated the discriminate factors. 96 The Justice determined that the unique towing contract in The Bremen
was uncommon because the parties involved were from different
nations and were concerned with transporting a very expensive
apparatus across a great expanse of ocean. 97 Given these extraordinary circumstances, the majority posited that it was reasonable for the Bremen Court to assume that the parties
conscientiously negotiated the selection of an adjudicatory
forum .98

The Court attested that Carnival's passage contract, on the
other hand, was completely conventional and virtually identical
to any passage contract. 99 The Court concluded that it was unreasonable to deduce that the Shutes would or could have negotiated the forum-selection clause with Carnival Cruise. 0 0 A
forum provision in this context, maintained the Court, would not
be the subject of negotiation.' 0 ' The Court conveyed that common sense commanded both that admission to a cruise ship be
manifested in a form contract and that the purchaser of a cruise
02
ticket did not enjoy equal bargaining power with a cruise line.1
95 CarnivalCruise, 111 S. Ct. at 1527. Common sense, the Court reasoned, indicates that this type of ticket is not the subject of bargaining and that passengers do
not enjoy equal bargaining power with the cruise line. Id.
96 Id. The Court also refuted the court of appeals' alternate justification for its
ruling against enforcement of the forum-selection clause, that the Shutes would
essentially be deprived of their day in court if the clause were enforced. Id. Justice
Blackmun summarily dismissed the court of appeals' "conclusory reference to the
record" in its determination that the Shutes were physically and financially prevented from conducting their lawsuit in Florida. Id. at 1528. There was no such
finding in the district court, the Justice chided. Id.
97 Id. at 1527 (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13
(1972)).
98 Id. The Court posited that it would have been entirely reasonable for the
Court to expect that the parties in The Bremen had carefully negotiated the forum
clause in their agreement, even absent the evidence that they had done so. Id.
99 Id. As an example of such a clause, the court cited Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille
Lauro ed Altri-Gestione, 858 F.2d 905, 910 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed, 490 U.S.
1001 (1989). Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. at 1527. In Hodes, the Court found a forum
clause contained in a form passage cruise contract enforceable. Hodes, 858 F.2d at
907, 916. To hold the clause unenforceable, the Court explained, would be a return to the "parochialism" denounced in The Bremen. Id. at 915.
100 CarnivalCruise, 111 S. Ct. at 1527.
IOl Id.

102

Id.
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The appellate court skewed the Bremen holding, Justice Blackmun
concluded, by neglecting salient dissimilarities0 3in the commercial
contexts in which these two contracts arose.1
Justice Blackmun then furnished reasons to support enforcement of such a provision. 10 4 The Justice began by identifying the
cruise line's purpose for limiting the places in which it can be
subject to suit. 10 5 First, because its passengers were of diverse
citizenry, the Justice explained, Carnival could be subjected to
litigation in any number of fora.'0 6 Second, noted Justice Blackmun, forum clauses also could benefit a carrier because specifying the forum in advance saved time, money, and judicial
resources by pre-determining the proper forum. 10 7 Moreover,
the Court postulated that the cruise line saved money by restricting its liability to a specified forum.' 0 8 The cruise line's savings,
asserted the Court, were passed on to consumers in the form of
lower fares. 10 9
The majority noted that the appellate court relied on the
Bremen discourse in identifying inconvenience factors that might
be sufficient to set aside a forum clause." 0 The majority further
asserted that the court of appeals failed to observe the proper
context in which these elements were intended to apply."' The
hypothetical that the Court posited in The Bremen, recounted Justice Blackmun, described a situation in which two Americans
agreed to settle their "essentially local disputes" in a distant forum.11 2 In such a case, the Justice advised, the gross onerousness
to one or more parties might play a more significant role in determining inconvenience, provided the complaining party could
103 Id. In view of these disparate business settings, the majority stated that determining whether Carnival's forum-selection clause was reasonable required refining
the analysis of The Bremen to address the specific nature of form passage contracts.
Id. (citing The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972)). Thus, as an
initial proposition, the majority rejected the court of appeals' determination that a
forum provision in a routine passage contract is not enforceable just because it is
not negotiated. Id.
104 Id.
105
106
107

Id.

Id.
Id. On the other hand, the forum clause itself has created a significant
amount of litigation. Erickson, supra note 3, at 1091. A WESTLAW search revealed
that forum-selection clauses were considered in nearly nine hundred federal and
state cases between 1980 and 1991.
108 Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. at 1527.
109 Id.
I10 Id. at 1528.
''' Id.
112 Id.
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satisfy a "heavy burden of proof."'" 3 The majority explained that
the dispute at issue was not "essentially local," and the Florida
choice of forum was not particularly distant, given that the tort
occurred off the Mexican coast.' 14 In view of these contextual
distinctions and because the Shutes had notice of the forum provision, the majority concluded that the Shutes did not meet the
required burden." 5
Stating that forum clauses in form passage contracts were a
legitimate subject for judicial scrutiny on fairness grounds, the
Court acknowledged that a forum clause motivated by bad faith,
such as one designed to discourage passengers from proceeding
with valid claims, might be unenforceable as fundamentally unfair. 1 6 The Court emphasized, however, that there was no suggestion of bad faith in the present case.'
The Justice explained
that the State of Florida was petitioner's principal place of business and Florida ports were the site of the departure and return
of many of petitioner's cruises." 8 These facts, the Court asserted, belied any notion that the cruise line was motivated by
bad faith in drafting the forum clause." 9
The Court charged that because there was no element present that would invalidate the forum-selection clause, the court of
appeals erred when it declined to give effect to the provision. 2 °
Justice Blackmun backed this determination by stating, without
elaboration, that no evidence.existed to suggest that agreement
to the clause was garnered by "fraud or overreaching."' 2' Returning to the notice issue, Justice Blackmun reiterated that the
22
Shutes had effectively admitted they had notice of the clause.1
Having notice' the majority reasoned, presumably meant that the
Shutes could simply walk away from the contract with
11" Id. at 1526 (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 17
(1972).
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. But cf. Hoffman v. Minuteman Press Int'l, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 552, 559
(W.D. Mo. 1990) ("Forum selection clauses that are drafted broadly so as to encompass even tort litigation that may arise between the contracting parties are
themselves prima facie evidence of fraud and overwhelming bargaining power.").
118 Carnival Cruise, Ill S. Ct. at 1528.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing notice); see also infra
notes 133-35 (same).
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Justice Blackmun found no merit in the Shutes' argument
that the forum clause in Carnival's passage ticket contract violated 46 U.S.C. § 183c, which limited the use of exculpatory
clauses by passenger carriers.' 2 4 Regarding the statutory clause
that prohibited a vessel owner from limiting or taking away a passenger's right to a court of competent jurisdiction, the majority
stressed that the Florida courts were courts of competent jurisdiction.' 25 Therefore, the Court asserted, the forum-selection
clause did not offend section 183c.' 2 6 The Court maintained that
rather than take away the passengers' right to a court of competent jurisdiction, the forum clause merely127appointed the Florida
courts, which plainly fit that description.
Justice Blackmun dismissed the Shutes' assertion that,
although the clause did not directly encroach on their right to
recover for the injury, it transgressed Congress's intended goal
by operating to place an extreme hardship on the Shutes' ability
to have their case heard in ajudicial court.' 28 The Justice, noting
that the Shutes did not cite any authoritative support for their
position, took issue with their interpretation of Congress' intent. 2 9 Contrary to the Shutes' view, Justice Blackmun reviewed
the legislative history of section 183c and concluded that Congress intended the legislation to prevent ship owners from incorporating arbitration clauses into contracts that removed the
jurisdiction of al judicial courts or limited the ship owner's liability for negligence. 3 0° The majority concluded that because the
Shutes' forum clause neither blocked judicial resolution of claims
nor purported to limit
Carnival's negligence liability, it did not
3
violate section 183c.'

1

Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, authored an in123 Id. at 1528. In the dissent, Justice Stevens noted that the Shutes had, by the
time they read the clause, already paid for the non refundable tickets. Id. at 1529
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
124 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). See 46 U.S.C. § 183c (West 1988). See also infra
note 139 for text of statute.
125 Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. at 1528 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126 Id.
127 Id. Justice Stevens would find the challenged forum clause in violation of 46
U.S.C. § 183c, if not literally, then at least in spirit. See id. at 1532 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
128 Id. at 1528-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 1529 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130 Id.
'31 Id.
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sightful dissent. 3 2 Although the focus centered on two contentions-that the forum clause violated section 183c and,
alternatively, that the clause was basically unfair-Justice Stevens
began his discussion by refuting the majority's finding that the
Shutes had full and fair notice of the provision.'3 " The Justice
opined that the eighth paragraph of a twenty-five paragraph fine
print contract on the back of a ticket was not likely to be seen by
the average person." 4
Moreover, the Justice conveyed that most passengers, including the Shutes, purchased their tickets before having had a
chance to read the contract printed on them. 35 Justice Stevens
argued that by the time the passenger had the ticket in hand, the
contract, including a provision that prohibited refunding unused
tickets, presumably was already in force.'3 6 TheJustice indicated
that this left ticket purchasers with a Hobson's choice--either accept all the contract provisions or cancel a planned vacation without a refund." 7 Placing such a burden on passengers, Justice
Stevens asserted, reduced the cruise8 line's costs but did not
3
render the forum clause reasonable.1
The dissent disclosed its central thesis by asserting that the
Id. at 1529 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens posited that the dissent would
disagree with the Court's analysis even if the Shutes had full and fair notice of the
forum provision. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). "[O]nly the most meticulous passenger" would
notice such a clause, Justice Stevens offered. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent buttressed this determination by appending the passage contract, in its original type size, to the dissent's opinion. Id. at 1534-38. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'35 Id. at 1529 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro ed Altri-Gestione, 858 F.2d 905 (3d Cir. 1988), cert.dismissed, 490 U.S. 1001 (1989), the
court interposed an agency theory to resolve the question of notice. Id. at 912.
The cruise passengers in Hodes obtained their tickets, as did the Shutes, through a
travel agent. Id. at 911-12. The Third Circuit indicated that the point of inquiry is
"whether someone has 'acted in the capacity of an agent in acquiring the ticket for
the plaintiff.'" Id. at 912 (quoting DeCarlo v. Italian Line, 416 F. Supp. 1136, 1137
n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)). Through their agent, the passengers were charged with notice of the clause. Id.
136 Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. at 1529 (Stevens,J., dissenting). Paragraph 16(a) of
Carnival's passenger ticket contract provided: "The Carrier shall not be liable to
make any refund to passengers in respect of lost tickets or in respect of tickets
wholly or partly not used by a passenger." Id. at 1534-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137 Id. at 1529 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The average passenger, noted the dissent, is not legally savvy enough to be sure whether the no-refund provision is
enforceable. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens assumed, therefore, that
the passenger would prefer risking enforcement of the forum clause to forgoing
settled vacation plans. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 377 P.2d
284 (Cal. 1962), the Supreme Court of California refused to give effect to a limita132
133
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clause violated 46 U.S.C. section 183c.119 Because terms that
limit a ship owner's liability or weaken a passenger's rights were
often the result of disparate bargaining power and did not serve
the public interest in inhibiting negligent conduct, instructed Justice Stevens, exculpatory clauses were long recognized as unjust
and unenforceable under federal admiralty law."t ' Justice Stevens indicated that exculpatory clauses took a variety of forms,
including the forum-selection provision, and shared the common
purpose of "[putting] a thumb on the carrier's side of the scale of
justice."' 4 1 Justice Stevens underscored the majority's contention that the forum clause in controversy was reasonable because
reducing the carrier's liability provided a benefit in the form of
reduced fares.' 4 2 This rationale, Justice Stevens warned, would
render all exculpatory clauses enforceable, a result contrary to
tion on liability provision in an insurance policy because the insured had to
purchase the policy before he could gain notice of its provisions. Id. at 298.
139 Carnival Cruise, 111 S.Ct. at 1529 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 46 U.S.C. § 183c
provides:
It shall be unlawful for the manager, agent, master, or owner of any
vessel transporting passengers between ports of the United States or
between any such port and a foreign port to insert in any rule, regulation, contract, or agreement any provision or limitation (1) purporting, in the event of loss of life or bodily injury arising from the
negligence or fault of such owner or his servants, to relieve such
owner, master, or agent from liability, or from liability beyond any
stipulated amount, for such loss or injury, or (2) purporting in such
event to lessen, weaken, or avoid the right of any claimant to a trial by
court of competent jurisdiction on the question of liability for such
loss or injury, or the measure of damages therefor. All such provisions or limitations contained in any such rule, regulation, contract,
or agreement are declared to be against public policy and shall be null
and void and of no effect.
46 U.S.C. § 183c (West 1988). The court of appeals had found the forum-selection
clause in this case unenforceable as against public policy. Shute v. Carnival Cruise
Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 389 n.12 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S.Ct. 1522 (1991). The
court therefore declined to give its opinion what effect section 183c has on forumselection clauses in general. Id.
140 Carnival Cruise, 111 S.Ct. at 1529-30 (Stevens,J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
quoted from The Kensington:
It is settled in the courts of the United States that exemptions limiting
carriers from responsibility for the negligence of themselves or their
servants are both unjust and unreasonable, and will be deemed as
wanting in the element of voluntary assent; and, besides, that such
conditions are in conflict with public policy. This doctrine was announced so long ago, and has been so frequently reiterated, that it is
elementary.
Id. at 1530 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting The Kensington, 183 U.S. 263, 268
(1902)).
141 Carnival Cruise, 111 S.Ct. at 1530 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142 Id. at 1530 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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time-honored jurisprudence. 43 ,.
The controlling factor in deciding whether the forumselection clause in Carnival's contract was valid, Justice Stevens
insisted, was 46 U.S.C. section 183c.' 4 4 Justice Stevens acknowledged that the statute was specifically directed at limitations on
carriers' liability, but stated that the House Report on the bill
revealed section 183c was added as a response to all ticketing
practices that reduced a passenger's ability to seek redress for
injuries in a qualified court ofjurisdiction. 45 Because of the general remedial purpose of section 183c and its legislative history
condemning such practices, the dissent reasoned that the language of the statute should be read liberally.' 46 Even though
there was no explicit reference to forum-selection clauses, Justice
Stevens imparted, the language of the statute was sufficiently expansive to cover them.147 Illuminating the judicial climate at the
time the statute was enacted, the Justice explained that forum
they
clauses were not specifically indicated in the statute because
48
were rejected by the common law, and thus rarely used.'
143

Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).

144 Id. at 1532 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent referred to the following excerpt
from the House Report: "The amendment.., is intended to, and in the opinion of
the committee will, put a stop to all such practices and practices of a like character."
H.R. REP. No. 2517, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1936). These words,Justice Stevens
conveyed, were given effect in section 183c, which reads in relevant part: "It shall
be unlawful ... to insert in any rule, regulation,contract, or agreement any provision or limitation... (2) purporting... to lessen, weaken, or avoid the right of any
claimant .. " Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. at 1532 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146 Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. at 1532 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
maintained that the forum clause in Carnival's passage contract, requiring Mr. and
Mrs. Shute to litigate in Florida, indeed compromised the Shutes' ability to obtain
legal redress for the accident that happened while on a cruise that "originated and
terminated in Los Angeles, California." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Instead of focusing on Mr. and Mrs. Shute's physical and financial abilities, however, the Justice
offered that witnesses could be more readily and less expensively gathered in a west
coast forum. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). If the dissent is correct in its belief that the language of 46 U.S.C. section 183(c) is broad enough to encompass the forumselection clause at issue, then, under choice of law doctrine, it must be applied "to
the total exclusion" of the forum clause. See Burlington R.R. v Woods, 480 U.S. 1,
4-5 (1987).
148 Carnival Cruise, 111 S.Ct. at 1532. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
indicated that exculpatory clauses were typically held unenforceable in admiralty
courts because such clauses usually arose out of an imbalance in bargaining power.
Id. at 1530 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The compelling state interest in discouraging
negligence is undermined, the Justice suggested, when exculpatory clauses are enforced in favor of the more powerful entity - the carrier. Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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Though Florida was not a foreign jurisdiction, Justice Stevens posited that requiring individuals to travel from Washington
to Florida to prosecute their case was analogous to forcing a corporation to travel to a foreign country.' 49 Given this postulate,
Justice Stevens concluded that the language in section 183c-forbidding a carrier to weaken, lessen or avoid a passenger's right to
a court of competent jurisdiction-should control the manifestly
unreasonable provision in the Shutes' passenger ticket
contract. 150
The dissent denoted that two strands of contract law intersected when evaluating the fairness of a forum-selection clause in
a passage contract. l '" The fundamental contract principle that
courts should enforce contracts according to their terms, posited
Justice Stevens, was tempered by reference to these two principles.152 First, the Justice explicated, a form contract prepared by
a party of superior bargaining power and submitted on a take-itor-leave-it basis is generally a contract of adhesion which is traditionally subjected to heightened scrutiny. 5 3 Justice Stevens observed that, because the weaker party had not expressed
voluntary and knowing consent to all contract's terms, some
commentators have suggested that such a contract may not be
enforceable at all.'5 4 The dissent pointed out, however, that due
to the great prevalence of form contracts in the commercial
arena, the common law took a more tolerant view toward contracts of adhesion, preferring instead to scrutinize their terms
Id. at 1533. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting). Recognizing that Carnival Cruise is a Panamanian
corporation, the dissent stated that the majority did not indicate whether it would
enforce Carnival's forum-selection clause if Panama had been the named forum. Id.
at 1533 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that where circuit
courts have applied the United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA)
§ 3(8), 46 U.S.C. § 1303(8) (1988), the requirement that suits must be settled in a
foreign jurisdiction has been held to lessen or weaken the plaintiff's right to recovery in violation of COGSA. Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. at 1532-33 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
151 Id. at 1530 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153 Id. at 1530-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154 Id. at 1531 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Rakoff, supra note 99, at 1180-83
(suggesting that terms in contracts of adhesion are frequently inserted to displace
"clear rules of law that would otherwise govern the transaction in question"); W.
David Slawson, Mass Contracts: Lawful Fraud in California, 48 S.CAL. L. REV. 1, 13
(1974) (principles of a free society assure that a person is not obligated to fulfill
duties without a manifestation of voluntary assent).
149
150
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under a reasonableness standard. 155
The second contract precept implied by the forum-selection
clause, Justice Stevens continued, was the historical view that the
56
clause ran counter to public policy and was therefore invalid.'
The Justice cautioned that while many courts discarded this
maxim, the prevailing rule remained that a forum clause was enforceable if it was not the subject of free bargaining, denied157a
remedy to one party, or created excess costs for one party.
Justice Stevens asserted that before the Court's decision in The
Bremen there was no question that a forum-selection clause in a
routine form passage contract was unenforceable. 5 " Even in the
wake of The Bremen, Justice Stevens opined, such a clause continued to be unenforceable.1 59
Until Carnival Cruise, each time the United States Supreme
Court specifically upheld the validity of a forum clause, the contracting parties were business entities whose negotiated agree155 Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. at 1531 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
reproduced Judge J. Skelly Wright's description of the state of the law:
Ordinarily, one who signs an agreement without full knowledge of its
terms might be held to assume the risk that he has entered a onesided bargain. But when a party of little bargaining power, and hence
little real choice, signs a commercially unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, or
even an objective manifestation of his consent, was ever given to all of
the terms. In such a case the usual rule that the terms of the agreement are not to be questioned should be abandoned and the court
should consider whether the terms of the contract are so unfair that
enforcement should be withheld.
Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting) (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350
F.2d 445, 449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (footnotes omitted)).
156 Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. at 1531 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Dougherty, supra note 56, at 409). The dissent admitted that "adherence to this general
rule" has declined since The Bremen. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Yet, under the
circumstances of CarnivalCruise, the dissent would not enforce the forum-selection
clause at issue. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Entering an agreement that contains a forumselection clause should not strip a party of his due process rights and, similarly,
construction of such an agreement should not be read as paramount to state longarm statutes. Mullenix, supra note 1, at 304.
159 Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. at 1531 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
argued that the present controversy was not really controlled by The Bremen. Id.
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Fine-print contracts appearing on the back of tickets, the
dissent indicated, were in no way discussed or alluded to in that case. Id. (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Instead, remarked Justice Stevens, The Bremen distinguished those
cases that endorsed the traditional common law approach (regarding all forum
clauses as void because they oust courts of jurisdiction) on the ground that the
common law doctrine did not reach the agreements in which the parties enjoyed
bargaining parity. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ments included provisions benefitting both parties. 60 For
example, the corporations involved in the Bremen controversy
equally enjoyed the benefit of selecting in advance the forum for
adjudication of potential disputes. Carnival's passage contract,
on the other hand, disproportionately benefitted the cruise line.
The trade-off in decreasing Carnival's cost of maintaining suit
was the diminishing of the Shutes' litigation rights. Outside of
signing the contract, there was no evidence that the Shutes truly
understood and consented to this consequence.
The majority purported to evaluate the reasonableness of
the forum clause by refining the Bremen analysis "to account for
the realities of form passage contracts."'' In tailoring its evaluation, the majority missed a significant distinction between Unterweser's (the international towing concern in The Bremen)
objective of reducing the uncertainties of litigation and Carnival's objective of limiting the forums in which it may be sued.' 62
There is no doubt that, considering the nature of its business,
Carnival Cruise might be subject to suit in a number of different
fora. 63 Carnival's interest in abating potential inconvenience,
however, in no way approaches Unterweser's interest in limiting
160 See Spradlin v. Lear Siegler Management Serv. Co., 926 F.2d 865, 867 (9th
Cir. 1991)("Bremen and most of the published opinions following it involve commercial contracts between two fairly sophisticated parties."); see also Stewart Org.,
Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988) (forum clause enforced against copy
machine dealer by reference to § 1404(a)); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S.
506, (1974) (clause requiring arbitration in France enforced against corporate purchaser of business entities). In Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 470 U.S. 475 (1989),
a case concerning a cruise ticket contract in which the parties were of manifestly
unequal bargaining strength, the Court examined the application of the final judgment rule when forum-selection clauses are at issue, not the enforceability of the
particular clause in dispute. Id. at 496.
161 Carnival Cruise, 111 S.Ct. at 1527. Justice Blackmun justified the majority's
modification of the Bremen test by asserting that Carnival's passage contract was
unremarkable. Id. The ticket was virtually the same as any other sold to passengers
on cruise lines. Id. The majority's opinion falls short, however, of pointedly identifying how enforcing a forum clause against unwitting passengers is fair.
162 The majority referred to the cruise line's desire to limit the fora in which it
could be sued as a "special interest." Id,
163 Carnival, in addition to utilizing the ports of numerous states and nations,
services customers from many domiciles and "reaches out" to those customers in
the form of advertising. See Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 382 (9th
Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991). Under established doctrine, however, it is
precisely this "reaching out" that makes the imposition of personal jurisdiction fair.
See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985); Southern Mach. Co.
v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 383 (6th Cir. 1968) (defendant "purposely
availed" itself of the benefits of the forum because he sold and leased machines in
the forum state).
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the vast uncertainties involved in international towage. 164 Unterweser sought to ameliorate the unquestionable hardship of
potentially being forced to litigate, in the event of a mishap, anywhere in its course of travel. 165 Carnival feared being sued in the
domicile of an injured passenger. In Unterweser's case, the subject of the potential suit was likely to be only incidentally related
to the forum. 166 Not so with Carnival Cruise. As the court of appeals determined, Carnival's substantial connection with the
State of Washington could be easily established by reference to
67
the minimum contacts test of InternationalShoe and its progeny. 1
The majority asserted that the clause in question was enforceable, though not the product of bargaining, because it was
unreasonable to assume that a cruise line would negotiate with a
passenger over a provision in a passage contract. 168 Not only,
however, was the clause not negotiated but the Shutes did not
see the contract until it arrived in the mail. Having already paid
for the non-refundable tickets, they had no choice but to accede
to the forum provision or lose their money. 16 9 The Court's rationale for finding this condition fair is unconvincing. Because
the Court found that the clause provided some advantages,
mainly to the cruise line, it concluded that placing the Shutes in
this no-win situation was permissible. 7 °
The Court cited several factors-the cruise line's interest in
limiting the fora in which it is subject to suit and courts' concern
in conserving time and resources-that purportedly rendered the
clause permissible.' 7 1 Yet, these concerns merely present the
fundamental reasons any enterprise would choose to include a
forum provision in its contracts. An additional element of the
majority's reasoning in finding the clause permissible, that passengers may enjoy lower fares as a consequence of agreeing to
164 See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,
165 Id.

407 U.S. 1, 13 (1972).

166 Id. Damage to the equipment in tow could have occurred anywhere along the
vessel's route, potentially submitting Unterweser to suit in any of the "countless
possible ports of refuge." Id.
167 Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 380, 381-83 (9th Cir. 1990),
rev'd, Il1 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
168 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522, 1527 (1991).
169 Id. at 1529 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co., 250 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ("Unconscionability has generally been
recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the
parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other
party.").
170 See Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. at 1527.
171 Id.
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the forum-selection clause,17 2 may be simply mistaken. More accurately, as Justice Stevens squarely asserted in his dissent, the
savings to the cruise line in reduced litigation costs was accom73
plished by placing an unfair burden on the passenger.
The majority undertook an assessment of whether the
forum-selection clause in this case was reasonable. 74 Justice
Blackmun began by stating that a reasonable forum clause "may
well be permissible for several reasons" and proceeded to list the
reasons the Court found the forum clause permissible in this context. 175 In the process, the Court recast the Bremen analysis and
no longer limit enforcement to cases involving parties of the
same sophistication or bargaining power. The Court favored the
forum-selection clause despite the obviously disparate bargaining power. 17 6 The result must speak for itself because the Court
did not directly reveal what made this forum clause reasonable.
Beyond its holding, the majority left nothing other than the
vague notion that almost any forum-selection clause is somehow
17 7
reasonable and permissible.
172 Id. Conceding that the clause may reduce Carnival's litigation costs does not
lead inexorably to the conclusion that this adhesive contract benefits the consumer.
173 Id. at 1529. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that thrusting an
inconvenient judicial forum on passengers cannot be sufficient to render the clause
reasonable. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Further, the majority offered no support
for its conclusion that the savings is passed on to the purchasers of tickets. The
majority seemed to offer the proposition as a matter to be taken on faith. In reality,
price decreases in the marketplace are generally determined by the effect on total
revenue when price is cut. Even in response to lowered costs, a large profit-making
corporation would not lower its prices unless the result would be an increase in
total revenue. It is therefore inaccurate for the Court to assume that Carnival's
passengers enjoy lower cruise ticket prices because Carnival has reduced its litigation costs. See generally, PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS
461-556 (1985) (discussing the analysis of decreasing cost and total revenue).
174 Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. at 1527. This evaluation, the majority asserted, required the Court to "refine" the test, as set forth in The Bremen, to fit the form
passage context. Id. See also supra note 166 and accompanying text.
175 Carnival Cruise, Ill S. Ct. at 1527 (emphasis added).
176 See Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 1990)
("If ever there was a case for stretching the concept of fraud in the name of unconscionability, it was Shute; and perhaps no stretch was necessary.").
177 Lower courts will have difficulty applying the decision because the Court's
reasoning implies that any boilerplate provision may stand as long as, by virtue of
its inclusion in the contract, some benefit to the drafting party can be shown. Even
apart from its imprecise rhetoric, the CarnivalCruise decision is unfortunate because
it obfuscates the common law criteria for establishing when terms in contracts of
adhesion are unenforceable. Professor Farnsworth has expounded:
A second judicial technique in dealing with standard forms is to refuse
to hold a party to a term on the ground that, although the writing may
plainly have been an offer, the term was not one that an uninitiated
reader ought reasonably to have understood to be a part of that offer.
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This is not to argue that forum-selection clauses should
never be used. On the contrary, contracting parties wisely endeavor to attain the highest degree of predictability in their commercial arrangements.I'7 The forum-selection clause is but one
contractual provision to which parties resort in achieving that
goal. Courts concerned with fairness, freedom of contract and
maintaining a contract's equitable balance should respect freely
negotiated forum provisions. 79 Nevertheless, by elevating the
sanctity of freedom of contract above traditional notions of substantial justice and fair play,' 80 the Carnival Cruise majority engaged in a form of Lochnerism,' 8 ' requiring the Shutes to
comply with a decidedly inequitable agreement that predominantly benefitted the cruise line. While the majority pointedly
recognized that the contract was certainly not freely negotiated,
the Court failed to perceive the inherent inequity in requiring the
Shutes to conform to a contract, the provisions of which they
were not aware until after they remitted the non-refundable
This result is especially easy to reach if the term is on the reverse side
of the form and the reference, if any, to terms on the reverse side is
itself in fine print or otherwise inadequate
E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 314 (1990). The reference, in Carnival's contract, was
large enough to be observed; there were, however, many fine-print provisions imbedded in the contract, rendering recognition of each individual provision difficult
for all but the most careful reader. Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. at 1529 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
178 Erickson, supra note 3, at 1092.
179 Most of the analytical difficulties wrought by forum clauses would, in effect,
be moot if all states were to give full effect to reasonable, fair, and freely negotiated
forum-selection clauses. See supra note 5 (listing states that do not recognize the
validity of forum selection clauses); See also supra note 86 (detailing cases in which
federal courts considered whether federal common law policy supporting contractual forum selection is strong enough to supplant state substantive law to the
contrary).
180 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
181 In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Court struck down health
legislation that limited bakery employees' hours to a maximum of ten hours per
day. Id. at 46 n. 1, 64-65. The Lochner majority was intent on safeguarding liberty of
contract, despite legislative recognition of adverse health affects suffered by the
bakers. Id. at 51, 57. The disparity in bargaining power between the bakers and
their employers was disregarded by the Court, even though the contention that
bakers were at liberty to accept or reject the terms of their employment was, in
reality, a fiction. See LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 578 (2d ed.
1988). It is similarly a fiction to suppose that Mr. and Mrs. Shute were not the
victims of Carnival's overweening bargaining power, but merely willing participants
in a mutually beneficial agreement. Yet, the majority saw fit to enforce the boilerplate forum provision in Carnival's cruise ticket, ignoring the fact that accession to
the clause in no way represented a deliberate and knowing exercise of the Shutes'
will.
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Recognizing Carnival's vast advantage in bargaining power
and the Shutes's "Hobson's choice" of having to pay for their
ticket before reading the contract, should have led the Court to
invalidate the forum clause in the interest of justice.8 3 Moreover, because of the compelling evidence that the State of Washington had personal jurisdiction over Carnival Cruise, it is
difficult to support the Court's determination to allow the cruise
line's interests in convenience and lowered costs to interfere with
the Shutes' lawful and valid interest in pursuing their legal
claim.' 84 While there surely are circumstances under which a
commercial cruise line has a legitimate interest in limiting the
fora in which it may be sued,' 85 the benefits and burdens of such
a limitation should be equitably distributed between the contracting parties. Where a cruise line clearly profits from the
forum-selection clause and the benefit to the passenger is discovered only by a great stretch in reasoning, the focus should properly be on the passenger's burden. In this case, a conscientious
application of Stewart and the Bremen would have rendered Carnival's forum-selection clause patently unreasonable, unenforceable and unconscionable.
Richard A. Gantner
182

It seems likely that future challenges to forum-selection clauses in form con-

tracts will center on the issue of notice. See Carnival Cruise, Inc. v. Superior Court
of Calif., Nos. B050142, B050255, 1991 WL 190309, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 27,
1991) (the California Court of Appeal supported Carnival's venue contentions;
however, pointing out that the Supreme Court, in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v.
Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991), did not address the issue of notice, the court remanded on that issue with an order to invalidate the clause as against any passenger deemed to lack adequate notice of the provision).
183 Regrettably, the Court chose instead to reconstruct the Bremen analysis to find
Carnival's forum-selection clause enforceable. Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, Ill
S. Ct. 1522, 1527 (1991).
184 See Hoffman v. Minuteman Press Int'l, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 552, 559 (W.D. Mo.
1990) ("No one should be able to erect, through forum selection clauses, a shield
of immunity to all litigation in undesirable forums.").
185 It may be unreasonable to subject the cruise line to suit in any of the foreign
ports to which it travels. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text. It would
be even more unreasonable to require passengers to traverse such distances to litigate. A reasonable, mutually beneficial restriction, therefore, might be to limit lawsuits to the courts of the United States.

